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Abstract
We explore the effect of income mobility and the persistence of redistributive
tax policy on the level of redistribution in democratic societies. An infinite-horizon
theoretical model is developed, and the properties of the equilibrium tax rate and
the degree of after-tax inequality are characterized. Mobility and stickiness of tax
policy are both negatively related to the equilibrium tax rate. However, neither is
sufficient by itself. Social mobility has no effect on equilibrium taxes if tax policy
is voted on in every period, and tax persistence has no effect in the absence of
social mobility. The two forces are complementary. Tax persistence leads to higher
levels of post-tax inequality, for any amount of mobility. The effect of mobility
on inequality is less clear-cut and depends on the degree of tax persistence. A
laboratory experiment is conducted to test the main comparative static predictions
of the theory, and the results are generally supportive.
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1 Introduction
Tax rates vary a great deal across countries, and even across states within countries. It
is important for a variety of policy reasons to understand why and to untangle the many
possible sources of this wide variation. One potentially important source of variation that
has received considerable attention from economists is social mobility. Income taxation,
by design, is redistributive in two senses. First, public goods provided by the tax revenues
- such as free education, clean water, fresh air, fire and police protection, and national
defense - generate a distribution of benefits that is roughly equal across income groups,
or at least far less skewed than the distribution of income. Second, tax revenues are also
used for income-tested policies that have direct redistributional consequences, such as food
stamps, medical insurance subsidies, and cash grants. Because of the key redistributional
effects of taxation, one might expect that in more-mobile societies, or in societies in
which considerable upward mobility is expected, poor and middle class voters may favor
relatively lower tax rates than they would if there were no tomorrow. One may be on
the low end of the income scale today - where higher tax rates are helpful - but have
beliefs (realistic or otherwise) of being considerably higher on the income scale tomorrow,
in which case lower tax rates would be better.
An underlying premise for this intuition, and one that is widely accepted as a stylized
fact, is that redistributive tax policy is relatively “sticky.” That is, in modern democratic
institutions, income tax rates are very difficult to change once they are in place, except for
relatively minor adjustments. So it is the combination of the persistence of unchanged tax
rates over many years and expectations of upward mobility that dampens voter preferences
for redistribution. This is called the prospect of upward mobility (POUM) hypothesis
(Benabou and Ok, 2001). While the prospect of upward mobility, in principle, can work
in the opposite direction - that is, rich voters preferring higher taxes to insure their
potential downward mobility - in a majoritarian political system, at least theoretically,
it is the median voter’s tax preferences that determine the equilibrium tax rate. As long
as the median voter’s income is less than the average income among the electorate (an
essentially universal empirical fact), the overall effect of income mobility on equilibrium
tax rates will result in lower income tax rates than in the absence of income mobility.
This paper proposes and analyzes an infinite-horizon model of equilibrium tax rates
to explore the effects of stochastic income mobility and tax persistence, allowing for both
upward and downward mobility. As far as we know, this is the first dynamic version
of the classic models of Romer (1975), Roberts (1977) and Meltzer and Richard (1981).
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The environment is characterized by a fixed distribution of wage rates in the population.
Initially, each individual in the economy is endowed with a wage rate that is drawn from
this distribution. The initial linear tax rate, t, is determined by a competitive political
process that yields the median voter’s ideal tax rate for that period. Each individual
chooses her labor supply optimally, given her wage and the tax rate, and pays fraction t of
her income in taxes. The aggregate taxes that are collected are then redistributed equally
to all individuals. Labor supply is increasing in wage and decreasing in the tax rate,
capturing the distortive nature of taxation. In each subsequent period, with some fixed
probability, α, wage rates are randomly reassigned using the same distribution of wages,
which generates the stochastic process governing income mobility. Also in each subsequent
period, with probability p, the previous period’s tax rate remains unchanged, and with
probability 1 − p, a new vote over tax rates is taken, which generates the stochastic
process governing tax persistence. Individuals are assumed to have correct expectations
about the stochastic process driving income mobility transitions and tax persistence,
and we characterize the equilibrium tax rate as a function of the parameters governing
the income mobility process. Individual induced preferences over the current period’s tax
rate are obtained by solving a system of stochastic infinite-horizon dynamic programs with
discounting. We prove that these induced preferences are single-peaked, which guarantees
the existence of a unique majority rule equilibrium tax rate. The equilibrium income
tax rate declines monotonically in the mobility and tax persistence parameters and the
discount factor, and it increases with wage inequality.
We also characterize the effect of mobility and tax persistence on after-tax inequality.
For any degree of mobility, greater stickiness of the tax policy (i.e., persistence) leads to
higher long-run inequality, as measured by the variance of the discounted value of the
infinite stream of after-tax income. The effect of an increase in income mobility on long-
run inequality is more complicated and depends on tax persistence. If tax persistence is
sufficiently high, then greater income mobility increases inequality. The opposite is true
if tax rates are revised frequently. The reason is that there are two opposing effects of
increasing mobility: on the one hand, mobility mechanically decreases inequality for any
fixed tax rate; on the other hand, the equilibrium effect of higher mobility reduces the tax
rate, which leads to greater inequality. Because inequality is increasing in tax persistence,
the second effect dominates the first if tax rates are revised infrequently. The comparative
statics with respect to efficiency, as measured by total income, are exactly the opposite,
so there is a long-run efficiency-equity tradeoff in our model.
The second half of the paper reports the design and results of a laboratory experi-
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ment implementing a simplified two-period environment that captures the most relevant
features of the theoretical model - in particular, sharing the same comparative statics
with respect to tax persistence and stochastic income mobility. The design uses multiple
treatments that allow us to compare the observed tax rates under different parameters
governing tax persistence and income mobility. There are four treatments. In treatment
one, there is no mobility and no tax persistence. Treatment two also has no tax persis-
tence, but there is an intermediate level of mobility between the two periods. The other
two treatments both have full tax persistence (i.e., the tax rate voted in period 1 remains
in place in period 2). Treatment three uses the same level of mobility as in treatment
two, and treatment four uses the highest possible level of mobility. Comparing the first
two treatments allows us to test the theoretical direct effect of income mobility on the
level of taxes (no effect) and the level of inequality (mobility reduces inequality) when
taxes are not persistent. Comparing treatments two and three allows us to to test the ef-
fect of tax persistence on equilibrium tax rates (persistence reduces taxes) and inequality
(persistence increases inequality), holding fixed the level of income mobility. Comparing
treatments three and four allows us to test the effect of very high levels of income mobility
on equilibrium tax rates (high mobility reduces taxes relative to intermediate levels) and
inequality (high mobility increases inequality relative to intermediate levels) when taxes
are persistent.
One might plausibly wonder how a laboratory experiment could be relevant to un-
derstanding something as complex as the effect of income mobility and tax persistence
on redistributive tax policy. There already exist a number of empirical political economy
studies that attempt to assess the validity of the hypothesis that social mobility and per-
sistent taxes will lower taxes and possibly have a negative impact on income inequality.
While some broad support is found for these effects, the estimates of their magnitude
vary wildly (across countries and across time) and, more importantly, are plagued with
measurement issues since researchers can only coarsely control for confounding factors.
Moreover, none of these studies controls for tax persistence, which is a key variable from
the theoretical perspective. All the studies are based on survey data about preferences
for redistribution. The strongest findings indicate that there is a negative relationship
between subjectively perceived probabilities of upward mobility, as elicited by survey
methods, and preferences for redistribution from the rich to the poor. There is relatively
little support for the hypothesis that there is a relationship between general mobility in-
dices and preferences for redistribution.1 To our knowledge, there is no empirical study
1See, for example, the Checchi and Dardanoni (2002) study of occupational and social prestige mobility
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that explores a causal link between income or social mobility and redistributive policy,
which is the focal point of the present study. Rather, all the existing studies focus on
identifying correlations between self-reported mobility and survey responses to qualitative
questions related to redistribution from the rich to the poor.
Laboratory experiments, by implementing an especially simple environment to which
theory is expected to apply, offer a clean methodology for directly testing the effects of the
theoretical parameters driving social mobility and the implemented level of redistribution.
Our experiment allows us to examine the effect of mobility on post-tax inequality. This
is very difficult to accomplish with field data because there are two confounding effects.
On the one hand, mobility has a mechanical effect that reduces inequality. If some of
today’s poor may become rich tomorrow, and vice versa, then one’s overall pretax income
across the two periods is going to be less dispersed than if there were no mobility. On the
other hand, the existence of social mobility in the population leads to lower equilibrium
tax rates, which increases inequality. The theory provides a framework for comparing the
relative magnitudes of these opposing forces, and the experiment allows us to measure
them and compare these measurements with the theory. Not only can the qualitative
comparative statics be tested, but our laboratory experiment allows for a quantitative
evaluation of the magnitudes of the effects that are predicted by theory. It also allows for
the possibility of clear rejections of the basic theory. If the theoretical predictions fail in
the simplest and most transparent version of the model, then that casts serious doubt on
the usefulness of the theory for application to complex economies and political systems,
the properties of which the field of political economy seeks to understand.
The experiment we report here contributes to a better understanding of these effects.
The design uses multiple treatments that allow for a stark comparison of voter tax pref-
erences and implemented tax rates under different assumptions about the persistence of
tax policy and different expectations about income mobility. The experiment produced
three main findings. First, the tax levels observed in the first two treatments are not
significantly different from each other. Thus, if tax policy is not persistent but, rather, is
set by a majority rule process in every period, then implemented tax rates are unaffected
by income mobility and income mobility decreases inequality, as predicted by the the-
in Italy, which finds that the results are very sensitive to the choice of index. Alesina and La Ferrara
(2005) construct a different index from the PSID, which has somewhat more explanatory power, and apply
it to a state-level analysis of mobility and redistributive preferences in the US. Ravallion and Loshkin
(2000) find survey evidence connecting perceived mobility and preferences for redistribution, but, again,
there is a disconnect between perceived and actual mobility. Rainer and Siedler (2008) also find similar
survey evidence for Germany, but their survey question addresses the progressivity of taxation rather
than the overall level of taxes.
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ory. Second, comparing treatments two and three, we find that mobility has a negative
effect on the tax level and, thus, leads to greater post-tax income inequality. We find
no significant difference in tax rates between treatment three (intermediate mobility) and
treatment four (high mobility), while the theory predicts a negative effect. As a result, an
increase in the mobility level from moderate to high reduces inequality, again in contrast
to the theory. We make two other observations about the magnitude of the effects: in
all treatments, the observed tax rates are lower than the theoretical equilibrium; and the
interactive effects of tax persistence and income mobility are larger in magnitude than
the theory predicts.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 1.1 reviews the related literature.
Section 2 presents the model. Section 3 derives the main theoretical results. Sections 4
and 5 describe the design and procedures of the experiment. Section 6 analyzes the results
of the experiment. Section 7 offers some concluding remarks.
1.1 Related Literature
In the theoretical literature on social mobility and redistributive taxes, Benabou and Ok
(2001) is most closely related to the present paper, but their model of social mobility
is quite different from ours in a number of ways, including the mechanism driving the
mobility effects. There are at least four differences. First, the distribution of income is
exogenously specified in their model and is assumed to be unaffected by income taxation.
In our model, individuals choose their labor supply optimally, conditional on the tax
rate, so income is endogenous and taxes distort both the distribution and absolute levels
of income, as in Meltzer and Richard (1981). Second, they consider only two possible
redistributive tax regimes - one regime with a zero tax rate and a second regime in which
all income is taxed and evenly redistributed to all individuals. While it may be useful
for pedagogical purposes to consider these extreme cases, it is not realistic at all; and,
moreover, neither of these two regimes is consistent with majority rule equilibrium in a
model of voting over linear tax schemes. In our model, we characterize majority rule
equilibrium in the space of linear tax schemes. Third, the POUM effect holds in their
model only for individuals with current income below the mean but whose future income
is expected to be greater than the mean. In our model, such individuals do not exist: all
individuals with an income below the mean today expect their income to be below the
mean tomorrow. The mechanism driving POUM in our model is that individuals with an
income below the mean today expect their income to be closer to the mean tomorrow,
which marginally depresses their demand for redistribution, resulting in a lower ideal
5
tax rate than they would prefer in a world without mobility. Fourth, Benabou and Ok
require concavity of the social mobility transition function for their result.2 The mobility
transition function in our model does not share this property: it is linear, not concave.
That is, for all individuals, expected future income is a linear increasing function of
today’s current income. Our model also differs in more superficial ways, as well: we have
a finite number of voters; a fixed distribution of productivities; an infinite horizon; and
tax persistence that is modeled differently. As in their article, the present paper assumes
risk neutrality, while risk aversion would tend to dampen the mobility and persistence
effects.
Also related, but for a much different reason, is work by Piketty (1995), which focuses
on the evolution of voter expectations about their own future social mobility. In his model,
these expectations diverge as a result of their different past mobility experiences. In our
theoretical model, we assume that voters know precisely the social mobility stochastic
process, and so, in principle, such theoretical learning effects do not play any role in our
model. A surprising finding from our experiment, however, is that learning from past
mobility experiences within the experiment has a significant effect on individual agents’
revealed preferences for redistribution that appears to be consistent with Piketty’s theory.
Two experimental papers investigate social mobility effects in the laboratory. Konrad
and Morath (2013) use a 2x2 design with three voters, where the first dimension compares
behavior based on whether subjects are matched either with computer robots playing
equilibrium strategies or with other subjects. The second dimension investigates how the
possibility of future mobility may affect voter preferences over redistribution. However, in
contrast to our model and the POUM literature more generally, taxes are not persistent in
their model. In each period, the assignment of voter types (wages) is randomly reshuﬄed
and, group matchings are reassigned, and each group chooses a new tax rate via a random
dictatorship mechanism.3 Thus, there is no theoretical basis for a social mobility effect
in their design. One of our treatments corresponds to that non-persistent tax regime
design, and, as reported below, we find no effect of social mobility on tax rates. Konrad
and Morath find marginally significant negative effects of perceived social mobility on
preferences for redistribution, which they attribute to status concerns. Similar results are
obtained both for the computer robot sessions and sessions with human interaction.
2Loosely stated, this implies that tomorrow’s proportion of voters with incomes below the mean is
less than the proportion of voters below the mean today. Such transition functions will depress today’s
mean income voter’s demand for redistribution if the tax policy persists for both periods.
3In the random dictator mechanism, each voter simultaneously proposes a tax rate; the mechanism
implements the highest or lowest tax rate with a 40% probability and chooses the median tax rate with
a 60% probability.
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Checchi and Filippini (2004) report an experiment that tries to directly implement the
Benabou and Ok (2001) model of social mobility - an individual choice experiment that
involves no voting or group interaction. The authors also investigate the effect of socio-
economic, demographic, and attitudinal characteristics (including risk attitudes and social
preferences) that were measured using a post-experiment survey. Neither the theoretical
model underlying the Checchi and Filippini experiment nor the experimental design and
methods are directly comparable to those in the present paper.
2 The Model
In this section, we lay out the primitives of the model and characterize equilibrium tax
rates and labor supply. The society consists of n > 1 infinitely-lived agents. In each
period, agents operate in a perfectly competitive and frictionless labor market. In the
initial period, k = 0, agents are endowed with productivities
w0 = (w01, ..., w
0
i , ..., w
0
n),
where w0i denotes the productivity of agent i in period 0. To represent mobility, we as-
sume that after each period, there is a probability α that the productivities are randomly
reshuﬄed. Thus, if the profile of productivities is wk in period k, then agent i’s produc-
tivity in period k + 1 is wk+1i = w
k
i with probability (1 − α) and is equal to wk+1i = wj
with probability α
n
for each j = 1, ..., n. Thus, the transition function is wk+1i = w
k
i with
probability (1− α + α
n
) and wk+1i = wj with probability
α
n
for each wj 6= wki .
Productivity plays an important role in determining agents’ labor market behavior
and incomes. In the labor market, which operates in each period, each agent chooses how
much labor to supply. In a given period k, an agent i with productivity wki that supplies
xki units of labor earns pre-tax income y
k
i = w
k
i · xki and bears an effort cost of 12(xki )2,
which represents the tradeoff between labor and leisure. Income and costs are measured
in units of consumption. In addition, each agent pays a fraction tk of earned income in
taxes. Below, we will describe in detail how tax rates are determined. Taxes are linear
and are used solely for redistributive purposes: tax revenues are redistributed in equal
shares among all agents in the society. Therefore, the payoff uki of agent i in period k
consists of three parts: after-tax disposable income, cost of labor, and an equal share of
collected taxes, with the last part depending on the labor decisions of other agents:
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uki (w
k
i , x
k
i , t
k) = (1− tk) · wki · xki −
1
2
(
xki
)2
+
1
n
n∑
j=1
t · wkj · xkj (1)
All individuals discount future utility with a constant discount factor δ; that is, the
overall utility of agent i is
Ui =
∞∑
k=0
δkuki (2)
Tax Regime. Society as a whole uses a democratic process to select a tax rate. That
is, the tax rates are determined by majority rule equilibrium, which is based on rational
expectations about how aggregate labor supply responds to changes in the income tax
rates. In each period, agents choose their labor supply after observing their current-period
productivity and the tax rate, to maximize (1). Tax persistence depends on a persistence
parameter, p. Specifically, p is the probability that the period t tax rate persists in period
t+ 1. With probability 1− p, there is a new vote over the tax rate in period t+ 1, which
will then persist until there is a new vote. Voting over taxes happens after agents learn
their current-period productivities. In our model, the distribution of productivity types
does not change over time (no aggregate uncertainty), so even when agents re-vote, the
equilibrium tax rate will remain unchanged. However, this re-voting possibility still has
an equilibrium effect purely through mobility, and, of course, it will also affect the value
functions and the ideal tax rates of all voters.4
We assume that in the absence of taxation, the median income is lower than the
average income - i.e., (wkm)
2 < 1
n
Z, where Z ≡ ∑ni=1(wki )2 denotes per period aggregate
income of the economy in every period k if the tax rate is zero. This condition guarantees
that in the static one-period model, the majority equilibrium is characterized by a positive
amount of redistribution. If this condition does not hold, then the equilibrium tax rate
equals 0 and mobility has no effect.
2.1 Equilibrium Tax Rates
In this section, we characterize agents’ equilibrium behavior in both the labor market
and the voting game. We assume that agents hold rational expectations regarding the
4Note that the mobility process specified above is completely governed by the parameters of the
game (α, {wi}ni=1) and is unrelated to agents’ performance in the labor market in the preceding periods.
We deliberately abstract away from additional forces that affect agents’ behavior in a world where the
prospect of upward mobility might depend positively on labor market performance. This allows us to
isolate the effect of expectations of future mobility on preferences for redistribution, which is the main
focus of this paper.
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aggregate labor supply response to changes in the tax rates in each period of the game and
correctly anticipate the probabilities of upward and downward mobility and the persis-
tence of the tax regime. Given that, in our model, the distribution of productivity types
and the parameters that govern the likelihood of mobility and re-voting on tax policy do
not change over time, agents’ optimal behavior is time-independent. Thus, to ease the
exposition, we suppress the superscript k, which denotes the period of the game. We
present here the main intuition of the results and refer the reader to the Appendix for
complete proofs.
Lemma 1. For a given a tax rate t, an agent with productivity wi supplies x
∗
i units of
labor, where x∗i (wi, t) =
(
1− t+ t
n
)
wi.
The optimal labor supply of an agent depends only on the current tax rate and current
economic status (productivity) and is independent of the labor supply decision of other
agents, the prospects of upward mobility, and the persistence of taxes. This follows from
the structure of the game, according to which agents can adjust their labor supply in
every period, after experiencing mobility and/or changes in tax policy.
Next, we characterize preferences for redistribution for each productivity level, as-
suming that all agents choose their labor supply optimally, as characterized in Lemma 1.
Consider agent i, who is currently endowed with productivity wi. Her preferences over
tax rates in the current period depend not only on her current productivity, but also on
her prospects for future productivity, the persistence of the tax rate, and the future tax
rate if the current tax rate expires. Because of the stationarity of the problem, with the
distribution of agent types constant over time, the tax rate in the event of a tax regime
change will always be t∗(p), which is derived from simultaneously solving the dynamic
program for all n agent types. Each agent type, wi, will have a long-run value associated
with the current tax rate, denoted by Vi(wi, t). This generates a system of n equations of
the following form:
Vi(wi, t) = u
∗
i (wi, t) + δp
[
(1− α)Vi(wi, t) + α
n
n∑
j=1
Vj(wj, t)
]
+ δ(1− p)
[
(1− α)Vi(wi, t∗(p)) + α
n
n∑
j=1
Vj(wj, t
∗(p))
]
for i = 1, ..., n,
(3)
where u∗i (wi, t) is the optimal current period utility of an agent with productivity wi if
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the current tax rate is t. Using Lemma 1, we derive:
u∗i (wi, t) =
w2i
2
·
(
(1− t)2 − t
2
n2
)
+ Z · t
n
(
1− t+ t
n
)
, (4)
where Z =
∑n
j=1w
2
j represents the aggregate income of the economy if the tax rate is
zero, and all workers choose labor optimally.
We solve the system of equations to obtain {Vi(wi, t)}i=1,...,n. Ideal tax rates are then
obtained for each agent type by the first-order condition with respect to t, and verifying
second-order conditions (see Appendix).
Proposition 1. The ideal tax rate of agent i with productivity wi is
t∗i (wi) =

n2
n2 − 1 ·
Z
n
− (wi)2
Z
n+1
(
2 + αδp
1−δp · n−1n
)
− (wi)2
if (wi)
2 <
Z
n
0 otherwise.
(5)
When agents are completely impatient, δ = 0, or there is no mobility, α = 0, or
taxes are non-persistent, p = 0, the model reduces to the one-period model analyzed in
Agranov and Palfrey (2015). At the other extreme, if agents are perfectly patient - i.e.,
δ → 1 - and tax rates are fully persistent - i.e., p = 1 - then for all α > 0, we obtain that
all agents, including those with the lowest current productivity, prefer no taxation and
no redistribution since the expectation of future mobility outweighs the benefits of redis-
tribution today, regardless of their current economic status: all they care about is their
long-run average after-tax income, which is maximized at t = 0. In intermediate cases,
δ ∈ (0, 1) and p ∈ (0, 1), agents with relatively low current productivity demand posi-
tive taxes, while those with relatively high productivities prefer zero taxation since their
contribution to total collected taxes exceeds the tax refund that they would receive from
redistribution. We show that each voter’s indirect preferences over tax rates are single-
peaked, so the equilibrium tax rate depends on the preferences of the median-productivity
agent: if (wm)
2 < Z
n
, the society will choose a positive amount of redistribution that is
equal to the ideal tax rate of the median agent - i.e., t∗m; otherwise, the society will end
up with no redistribution at all.5
Next, we show how equilibrium tax rates change in response to an increase in tax
persistence parameter p and economic mobility α.
Corollary 1. Higher tax persistence leads to (weakly) lower equilibrium taxes.
5Notice that the interior equilibrium tax rates depend only on the product δ · p.
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Intuitively, all else equal, the longer the current tax regime lasts (the higher the p),
the more likely currently low-productivity agents are to transition upwards and improve
their economic status, in which case they would enjoy lower tax rates.
Corollary 2. Higher mobility leads to (weakly) lower equilibrium taxes.
Agents with relatively low productivity today have a greater chance of upward mobility
in the future when reshuﬄing probability α increases, all else equal. Observe that there
is also a counteracting effect by the higher types’ prospect of downward mobility, which
one might think would put upward pressure on the equilibrium tax rate. However, there
is no such effect in equilibrium because the median voter’s income is always below the
average income, given our assumption of no aggregate uncertainty.
2.2 Inequality
How do tax persistence and economic mobility affect the level of inequality in the soci-
ety? To measure inequality, we consider the dispersion of long-run incomes of agents.
Specifically, the discounted net present value of agent i with productivity wi in period 0
in equilibrium, in which the tax rate is t∗, can be written as
Vi(wi, t
∗) =
u∗i (wi, t
∗)
1− δ(1− α) +
αδ · u¯∗(t∗)
(1− δ)(1− δ(1− α) ,
where
u¯∗(t∗) =
1
n
n∑
j=1
u∗j(wj, t
∗)
is per-period utility in equilibrium averaged across agents, and u∗i (wi, t
∗) is utility of agent
i with productivity wi in equilibrium, which is given by equation (9) evaluated at t
∗. Thus,
inequality in the society can be measured by the variance of long-run incomes - i.e.,
var (Vi(wi, t
∗)) =
1
n
n∑
j=1
(
Vj(wj, t
∗)− V¯ (t∗)
)2
,
where
V¯ (t∗) =
1
n
n∑
j=1
Vj(wj, t
∗).
Proposition 2. An increase in tax persistence increases inequality in the society - i.e.,
∂var (Vi(wi, t
∗))
∂p
> 0.
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Higher tax persistence, p ↑, leads to a (weakly) lower equilibrium tax rate (Corollary
1). This, in turn, increases efficiency since lower taxes reduce distortions in the labor
market, but also increase long-run inequality between agents. While higher stickiness of
the tax regime unambiguously increases the dispersion of agents’ incomes, the effect of
income mobility is more complicated, as described in Proposition 3.
Proposition 3. For Z > Z¯(n,wm) and δ < δ¯(α,Z, n), there exists a unique p¯ such that
∂ var(Vi(wi, t))
∂α
< 0 for p ∈ (0, p¯)
∂ var(Vi(wi, t))
∂α
> 0 for p ∈ (p¯, 1).
Otherwise, for all p ∈ (0, 1), we obtain ∂ var(Vi(wi,t))
∂α
< 0.
Intuitively, an increase in mobility parameter α has two main effects that work in
opposite directions. First, higher mobility mechanically reduces inequality, as agents move
up and down the income ladder more often. Second, higher mobility reduces equilibrium
tax rates, which increases income inequality. When discount factor δ is high enough, the
first effect naturally dominates the second one. The situation is more complicated when
the discount factor is not too high - i.e., δ < δ¯(Z,wm, n, α). In this case, the magnitude of
the two effects depends on the tax persistence. If tax rates are revised frequently - i.e., p
is low - then mobility reduces inequality since inequality is increasing in tax persistence.
However, if the tax regime is sticky enough - i.e., p is high - then, contrary to common
wisdom, the long-run inequality increases with income mobility.
3 Experimental Design
3.1 Parameterization
The experiment we conducted uses a two-period environment in lieu of implementing an
infinite-horizon environment with a random stopping rule. As we show below, this simpli-
fied two-period version of the model captures the most relevant features and comparative
static predictions of the general infinite-horizon model. Each experimental treatment is
characterized by the combination of tax persistence p and mobility parameter α. We used
two extreme values of persistence, p = 0 and p = 1, and three values of mobility, α = 0,
α = 0.6, and α = 1. Overall, we ran four different treatments with the following combi-
nations of (p, α): (0, 0), (0, 0.6), (1, 0.6) and (1, 1). In all treatments, we used groups of
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five agents, n = 5, and the following vector of productivities:
(w1, w2, w3, w4, w5) = (5, 5, 5, 10, 10)
In other words, there were two types of agents: those with low productivity (poor, denoted
wl) and those with high productivity (rich, denoted wh). Since the majority is poor, the
assumption w2m <
Z
n
is satisfied. The overall payoff of agents in the two-period model is
given by the sum of agents’ payoffs in two periods, where the per-period payoff of agent
i is given by equation (9) evaluated at equilibrium tax rate t∗.
The equilibrium tax rate, t∗(p,α), is determined by the ideal tax rate of the poor minority
and depends on the combination of tax persistence and mobility parameters. When taxes
are not persistent, the equilibrium tax rate is independent of α and is given by equation
(5) with p = 0 substituted in:
t∗(0,α) =
n2
n2 − 1 ·
Z
n
− (wl)2
2Z
n+1
− (wl)2
. (6)
When the tax rate chosen in period 1 persists in period 2 - i.e., p = 1 - the equilibrium
tax rate is given by:
t∗(1,α) =
n2
n2 − 1 ·
Z
n
− [χ(α) · (wl)2 + (1− χ(α))(wh)2]
2Z
n+1
− [χ(α) · (wl)2 + (1− χ(α))(wh)2] , (7)
where χ(α) = 1 − α(n−m)
2n
represents the relative frequency with which a period 1 poor
agent remains poor in period 2. For the chosen parameters, the ideal level of redistribution
for the rich minority is zero for all considered constellations of tax persistence and income
mobility.
The overall incomes of poor and rich agents in the two-period model are given by
Vi(wl, t
∗
(p,α)) =
(
2− 2α
5
)
· u∗(wl, t∗(p,α)) +
2α
5
· u∗(wh, t∗(p,α))
Vi(wh, t
∗
(p,α)) =
3α
5
· u∗(wl, t∗(p,α)) +
(
2− 3α
5
)
· u∗(wh, t∗(p,α)).
These expressions are used to assess the level of inequality in the society, as measured
by the variance of the long-run incomes from the period 1 perspective, after period 1’s
productivities are assigned. Table 1 summarizes the theoretically predicted equilibrium
tax rates and levels of inequality in our four experimental treatments.
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Table 1: Parameters and Experimental Design
Treatment Tax Persistence Mobility t∗(p,α) var(Vi) # sessions # groups # subjects
NM p = 0 α = 0 0.47 99.93 3 12 60
M1 p = 0 α = 0.6 0.47 69.95 4 17 85
M2 p = 1 α = 0.6 0.38 135.47 3 16 80
M3 p = 1 α = 1.0 0.30 159.69 3 17 85
The two versions of the model, the infinite-horizon model discussed in Section 2 and
the simplified two-period model described in this section, share the main comparative
static predictions with respect to mobility and tax persistence parameters, which are the
focus of this project. We formulate the following hypotheses based on the theoretical
model:
Hypothesis 1: When taxes are not persistent, prospects of income mobility have no
effect on equilibrium tax rates - i.e., t∗(0,0) = t
∗
(0,0.6).
Hypothesis 2: For a fixed mobility α, higher tax persistence leads to lower equilibrium
tax rates - i.e., t∗(0,0.6) > t
∗
(1,0.6).
Hypothesis 3: For a fixed level and positive level of tax persistence p, an increase in
mobility parameter α leads to lower equilibrium tax rates - i.e., t∗(1,0.6) > t
∗
(1,1).
Hypothesis 4: For a fixed mobility α, an increase in the persistence of taxes leads to
higher inequality - i.e., var(Vi(wi, t
∗
(0,0.6))) < var(Vi(wi, t
∗
(1,0.6))).
Hypothesis 5: The effect of an increase in mobility α on overall inequality depends
on the tax persistence. When taxes are not persistent, higher mobility leads to lower
inequality - i.e., var(Vi(wi, t
∗
(0,0))) > var(Vi(wi, t
∗
(0,0.6))). The effect is the opposite when
taxes are persistent: higher mobility leads to higher inequality - i.e., var(Vi(wi, t
∗
(1,0.6))) <
var(Vi(wi, t
∗
(1,1))).
3.2 Experimental Protocol
All experimental sessions were conducted at the ESSL (Experimental Social Science Lab-
oratory) at University of California, Irvine. Subjects were recruited from the general un-
dergraduate population, from all majors. Experiments were conducted using Multistage
software, which was developed from the open source Multistage package.6 We conducted
6Multistage package is available for download at at http://software.ssel.caltech.edu/.
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13 sessions, using a total of 310 subjects. No subject participated in more than one ses-
sion. The experiments lasted, on average, one and a half hours, and subjects’ average
earnings were $28, including the $7 show-up fee.7
For all four treatments, an experimental session consisted of three parts. In Part I,
we elicited the subjects’ risk attitudes using the investment task of Gneezy and Potters
(1997).8 In this task, subjects are given 100 points, which are worth $2, and they allocate
these points between a safe investment, which returns one point for each point invested,
and a risky investment, which returns 2.2 points for each point invested with probability
50% and produces no returns for the investment with probability 50%. Any amount
earned from this task was added to the overall earnings in the session.
For the next two parts of the experiment (Parts II and III), subjects were divided
into groups of five subjects: three were assigned low productivity of 5, and two were
assigned high productivity of 10. During the entire experiment, subjects interacted only
with other subjects assigned to their own group, so each group of five people represents
an independent observation for the statistical analysis, hereafter.
Part II consisted of ten periods. In this part of the experiment, subjects gained
experience with the labor market. At the beginning of each period, agents were informed
of the tax rate for that period. Then they chose how much labor to supply without
knowing what other subjects in their group chose. Labor supply decisions could to be any
number between 0 and 15 with up to two decimal places.9 After all five agents had made
their choice, subjects received feedback that specified the labor supply of each agent in
their group, and an agent’s own payoff was displayed on the screen, broken down into
three parts: after-tax income, the quadratic cost of labor, and their tax rebate (equal
share of collected taxes). When the period ended, the group moved on to the next period,
which was identical to the previous one, except for the tax rate imposed at the beginning
of the period. In this training part of the session, subjects went through different possible
tax rates, in the following order: 0.50, 0.15, 0.70, 0.62, 0.35, 0.05, 0.27, 0.75, 0.90, and
0.20.
Part III was the main part of the experiment. This was also the only part that differed
across the four treatments and consisted of the ten matches, with each match being the
two-period game described in Section 3.1. In each of the ten matches, the productivity of
7The complete instructions for one of our treatments are presented in the Appendix.
8This method is among the more common methods for eliciting risk attitudes of subjects in laboratory
experiments (see survey of Charness, Gneezy and Imas (2013)).
9We used neutral terminology in the experiment and avoided references to work, effort, productivity
or other terms associated with labor market or relative income. Instead, individual labor supply decisions
were called investment levels and productivities were called values.
15
subjects in period 1 was fixed and was the same as the productivity they were assigned at
the beginning of Part II. Second-period productivities were reassigned depending on the
value of α in each treatment: in the NM treatment, there was no income mobility - i.e.,
αNM = 0; in Treatments M1 and M2, the mobility parameter was αM1 = αM2 = 0.6; and
in M3, the mobility parameter was αM3 = 1. In treatments with α > 0, when subjects
were reassigned productivities in period 2, exactly three out of five subjects in a group
were randomly chosen to receive low productivity of 5, and the two remaining subjects
received high productivity of 10.
In the NM and M1 sessions, at the beginning of each period of each match, subjects
observed their productivity for the current period and were asked to submit a proposal
for the tax rate in the current period. The median proposal (third-lowest tax rate) was
announced to all subjects and implemented for that period. We chose this mechanism
because every member has a dominant strategy to propose her ideal tax rate.10 After the
tax rate for the current period was determined, subjects chose their labor supply as in
Part II of the experiment. At the end of the period, subjects got to observe their payoff for
this period along with all labor supply decisions and tax proposals of the other subjects
in their group. In the NM treatment, period 2 productivities were the same as in period
1, and subjects were informed in advance that this would be the case. In Treatment
M1, depending on the realization of α, period 2 productivities were either the same or
different. Note that the subjects knew that period 2 tax rates would be determined after
they learned their period 2 productivities. This two-period game was repeated ten times
(ten matches).
In the M2 and M3 sessions, subjects proposed tax rates only once, in period 1. The
tax proposals were elicited after they were informed of their own period 1 productivities,
but before they knew whether or not their productivity would change in period 2. The
instructions provided subjects with explicit calculations of their chances of experiencing
mobility in period 2. The median proposal was then announced to all subjects and
implemented in both periods of that match. The remaining details of Treatments M2 and
M3 were exactly the same as those of NM and M1. That is, after the tax rate in period
1 was determined, subjects chose their labor supply for period 1. After that, subjects
learned their payoff for period 1, as well as the period 1 labor supply decisions and tax
proposals made by other members of their group. Then, subjects proceeded to period
2, in which they each first learned the (possibly different) period 2 productivities of all
group members, including their own, chose labor supply given the tax rate previously
10Agranov and Palfrey (2015) also used this voting method.
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determined in period 1, and observed the period 2 payoffs and choices made by other
subjects in their group. This two-period game was repeated ten times (ten matches).
To help subjects calculate hypothetical earnings from different labor supply and tax
choices, we provided them with a built-in calculator that appeared on their monitors.
Subjects could use the calculator before submitting their tax proposals and before making
their labor decisions. For labor supply decisions, to use the calculator, subjects had to
make three choices: the productivity for which they wanted to observe the hypothetical
payoff; a labor supply decision for the chosen productivity level; and a guess of the total
taxes collected from the other members in the group. For proposing tax rates, subjects
also had to enter a fourth parameter: the tax rate for which the hypothetical period
earnings would be computed. After the subjects entered all of their information, the
calculator computed the payoff of a subject with chosen productivity in this hypothetical
scenario. Subjects could use this calculator as many times as they wanted to.11
The number of sessions conducted and the number of participants in each treatment
are summarized in Table 1.12
4 Results
We present the results of our experiments using the theoretical framework described above
as our basis. We start by comparing implemented taxes, subjects’ labor supply decisions
and overall inequality levels across our experimental treatments. We test the five hypothe-
ses summarized in Section 3.1 and document any quantitative and qualitative differences
between observed and predicted outcomes (Section 4.1). We then investigate several
mechanisms that can account for these differences (Section 4.2). This part of the anal-
ysis focuses on identifying the main determinants of preferences for redistribution in the
presence of income mobility.
Most of the statistical analysis that follows focuses on the last five matches in each
treatment, which we refer to as the experienced matches. This is standard approach in
the literature that reduces noise in the data due to learning in the first iterations of the
game. To compare average outcomes between two groups (whether two periods of the
same treatment or two different treatments), we use random effects TOBIT regressions.
11See the Appendix for sample screenshots.
12Two groups of five subjects in the NM treatment were interrupted during the session due to computer
crashes. However, since subjects interacted only within their own group and were never rematched with
other subjects, these difficulties did not affect the functioning of other subjects in these sessions. We
exclude these two groups from the analysis.
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Specifically, we regress the outcome of interest - i.e., implemented tax rates, labor supply
decisions or income dispersion - on a dummy variable that indicates one of two considered
groups, with standard errors clustered at the group level, to account for interdependencies
of observations that come from the same group. We say that the difference between
outcomes in the two groups is statistically significant if the estimated coefficient on the
dummy variable is different from zero at the standard 5% significance level, and we report
the p-values associated with it. To compare inequality levels between two treatments, as
measured by variance of agents’ total incomes, we use a two-sample variance ratio test and
report p-values associated with the statistics. Finally, to compare observed outcomes with
those predicted by theory, we use random effects GLS regressions, in which we regress
the variable of interest on a constant term alone, while clustering observations by groups.
We report the p-value of a test where the null hypothesis is that the estimate equals the
theoretically predicted value.
4.1 Treatment Effects
4.1.1 Implemented Taxes
Figure 1 displays the time path of the average implemented taxes in each treatment, while
Table 2 presents the average taxes observed in the experienced matches.
Figure 1: Implemented Taxes (averaged across groups in a match)
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  TAXES	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  rate	  observed	  among	  all	  groups	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match	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Notes: In the NM and M1 treatments, we pool the data from the first and second periods.
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Table 2: Average Implemented Tax Rates in Experienced Matches
NM (t∗ = 0.47) M1 (t∗ = 0.47) M2 (t∗ = 0.38) M3 (t∗ = 0.30)
mean (se) mean (se) mean (se) mean (se)
Period 1 0.34 (0.04) 0.30 (0.04) 0.18 (0.04) 0.22 (0.04)
Period 2 0.33 (0.04) 0.29 (0.03) 0.18 (0.04) 0.22 (0.04)
Pooled across Periods 0.33 (0.04) 0.30 (0.03) 0.18 (0.04) 0.22 (0.04)
Notes: t∗ depicts the theoretically predicted equilibrium tax rate in each treatment. Robust standard
errors are in parentheses, clustered by group.
When taxes are not persistent and agents make decisions about the tax rate after they
learn their productivities in each period of the game, the presence of income mobility is
predicted to have no effect on the amount of redistribution (Hypothesis 1). To test this
hypothesis, we compare implemented taxes in the M1 and NM treatments. As is evident
from Table 2, this hypothesis is borne out in our data: pooling the data from both periods,
we observe no significant difference between tax rates in the NM and M1 treatments
(p = 0.454).13 Moreover, given that our setup features no aggregate uncertainty, tax rates
in both periods of the NM and M1 treatments are predicted to be the same. Regression
analysis confirms this for both the NM treatment (p = 0.332) and the M1 treatment
(p = 0.619).
For a fixed level of income mobility, higher tax persistence leads to a lower amount of
redistribution, as the pivotal voter expects to climb the income ladder with some positive
probability and is willing to trade off some current income in anticipation of this potential
move (Hypothesis 2). To test this hypothesis, we compare tax rates in the M1 and M2
treatments, which both feature α = 0.6 and differ only in their tax persistence parameter
p. Hypothesis 2 is borne our in our data: tax rates in the M2 treatment are significantly
lower than those in both periods of the M1 treatment (p = 0.015).
Finally, for a fixed and positive level of tax persistence, higher income mobility is
predicted to lower equilibrium tax rates, as upward mobility is more likely for the pivotal
voter (Hypothesis 3). Contrary to this hypothesis, we detect no significant difference
between the average implemented taxes in the M2 and M3 treatments (p = 0.440). We
do, however, observe a higher amount of redistribution in the NM and M1 treatments
compared to the M3 treatment, which indicates that the combination of higher mobility
and higher tax persistence has a significant effect on the level of redistribution (p = 0.024
13We reach the same conclusion when we perform a regression analysis separately for each of the two
periods of the game: p = 0.412 and p = 0.521 for comparison of the NM and M1 treatments in the first
and second period, respectively.
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for the M3 versus the NM treatment and p = 0.094 for the M3 versus the M1 treatment).
While most of the comparative static hypotheses of levels of redistribution across our
treatments follow theoretical hypotheses, the levels are off. As is apparent in Figure 1 and
Table 2, and is confirmed by regression analysis, for each treatment, we reject the null
that the average implemented tax rate equals the theoretically predicted one (p = 0.001
for NM, p < 0.001 for M1, p < 0.001 for M2, and p = 0.0205 for M3). In all cases,
the implemented tax rates are lower than predicted. We explore possible causes of these
differences in Section 4.2.
4.1.2 Labor Supply Decisions
Table 3: Estimated Normalized Labor Supply Functions in Experienced Matches
NM M1
const (se) slope (se) const (se) slope (se)
Poor 0.99 (0.02) -0.76 (0.04) 1.01 (0.02) -0.78 (0.04)
Rich 0.98 (0.03) -0.76 (0.05) 1.01 (0.02) -0.84 (0.04)
M2 M3
const (se) slope (se) const (se) slope (se)
Poor 1.03 (0.03) -0.81 (0.10) 0.98 (0.02) -0.74 (0.05)
Rich 1.00 (0.02) -0.80 (0.08) 0.98 (0.21) -0.74 (0.05)
Notes: Random effects TOBIT regressions of normalized labor supply decisions regressed on implemented
tax rates and a constant, using data from both periods and clustering standard errors by the group.
Normalized labor supply is labor supply divided by productivity. ∗∗ indicates that theoretically predicted
value of a coefficient falls outside of 95% confidence interval of estimated coefficients (we observe no such
case).
Lemma 1 predicts no treatment effects on labor supply functions. Indeed, the optimal
choice of labor depends exclusively on the level of redistribution and an agent’s own
productivity, both of which are known at the time agents make their labor choices. To
check this hypothesis, we regress the normalized labor supply on the tax rate and a
constant, where the normalized labor supply is labor supply divided by productivity.
Theory predicts that the coefficient on the tax rate is −0.8 with a constant term equal
to 1, for both productivity types, independently of the treatment and the period of the
game. Table 3 reports the estimated coefficients from random-effects TOBIT regressions
using data from the experienced matches in each treatment and each productivity level
separately, with standard errors clustered at the group level.14 As is evident from Table
14In the Appendix, we report similar regressions conducted separately for each period of the game using
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3 in all 16 cases, theoretically predicted values fall inside a 95% confidence interval of
the estimated coefficient. Thus, we conclude that labor supply decisions of both poor
and rich agents in all four treatments are, in general, consistent with the theoretically
predicted ones. In particular, we observe no systematic deviations in the labor market
decisions that could indicate the presence of other-regarding preferences such as altruism
or inequality aversion.
4.1.3 Inequality
In this section, we turn our attention to the overall level of inequality in the society,
which, in theory, depends on the various parameters of the environment, including the
persistence of the tax regime, the (endogenous) tax rate, and the degree of mobility, all
of which interact in a non-trivial way, as discussed in Section 2.2. Following theoretical
investigation, in this section, we measure the inequality in society by the dispersion (vari-
ance) of agents’ total income over the course of both periods.15 In the Appendix, we show
that the same conclusions would be reached if one were to use GINI coefficients to study
inequality levels across our four experimental treatments. Table 4 presents observed and
theoretical levels of total income dispersion across our experimental treatments.
Table 4: Inequality Levels Across Treatments in Experienced Matches
Theory Observed
theoretical empirical mean median robust SE
mobility freq mobility freq
NM 99.93 99.90 403.44 304.75 81.50
M1 69.95 70.54 305.90 165.93 60.53
M2 135.47 138.09 488.24 379.57 62.59
M3 159.69 164.39 357.24 235.43 58.79
Notes: Variance of agents’ total incomes is reported for each treatment separately. The total income is
the sum of agents’ utilities in both periods of the game, which consists of after-tax income, costs of labor
and tax rebate. Theoretical values of variance are reported using theoretical mobility frequencies (column
1) and empirical realizations of mobility (column 2). Observed variance is computed using subjects’ total
incomes separately for each group in each of the last five matches of each treatment. The robust standard
errors are obtained by clustering observations by individual groups.
all ten matches, as well as regressions in which we consider experienced matches and cluster standard
errors by subjects. These estimations produce results very similar to the ones presented here and,
therefore, are omitted from the main text for brevity.
15To be consistent with the theoretical analysis, our measure of total income of agents across two
periods sums up agents’ utility in both periods, which includes after-tax income, costs of labor and tax
rebate. The alternative measure that nets out the quadratic cost of effort, which represents a labor-leisure
trade-off, yields similar results and is omitted from the main text of the paper for brevity purposes.
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For a given level of mobility, an increase in persistence of taxes is predicted to in-
crease inequality, as it lowers the equilibrium tax rates selected by the democratic process
(Hypothesis 4). To test this hypothesis, we compare the inequality levels in M1 and M2,
which hold the mobility parameter constant and vary the tax persistence parameter. This
hypothesis is borne out in our data, as M2 features significantly higher inequality levels
than M1 (Two-sample variance ratio test: p < 0.001).
The effect of income mobility on inequality levels is more complex, as it depends on
how persistent the tax regime is. Our parameterization captures two different scenarios:
(1) higher income mobility reduces inequality when taxes are not persistent; and (2) higher
income mobility increases inequality when taxes are persistent (Hypothesis 5). To test
the first part of Hypothesis 5, we compare inequality levels in the NM and M1 treatments,
both of which feature non-persistent tax regimes, but only M1 incorporates mobility. Our
data confirm that inequality decreases when mobility is introduced; however, the effect is
quite modest (One-sided variance ratio test: p = 0.0561).
To test the second part of Hypothesis 5, we compare inequality levels in the M2 and
M3 treatments, both of which feature persistent tax regimes, but M3 has higher mobility
than M2. Contrary to the theory, we observe lower inequality in M3 than in M2 (Two-
sided variance ratio test: p = 0.002). To reconcile this evidence with previously reported
implemented tax rates, recall that an increase in income mobility affects inequality in two
opposing ways: first, higher mobility mechanically reduces inequality, as agents’ produc-
tivities are reshuﬄed more often; second, higher mobility leads to lower equilibrium tax
rates, which increases inequality since society engages in less redistribution. However, as
is evident from Figure 1, Table 2, and the analysis presented in Section 4.1.1, the tax rates
in the M2 and M3 treatments are fairly similar. Therefore, the dominant effect between
the two described above is the one that works in the direction of reducing inequality.
Finally, in all four treatments, the levels of observed inequality are much larger than
those predicted by theory. There are two reasons for that. First, as we documented above,
the average implemented tax rates are generally below the equilibrium rates. This by
itself increases the inequality since lower levels of redistribution increase the dispersion of
agents’ incomes. Second, in all treatments, there are several group outliers that implement
zero tax rates; these groups drive the levels of dispersion up in all treatments.
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4.2 Understanding deviations from the theory
There are several interesting features of the data in terms of both the dynamic evolution
of tax rates across the ten matches and the tax-rate levels. In both periods and in all four
treatments, the implemented tax rates are significantly below the theoretical rates. Even
after subjects experienced the game for five matches, in both the NM and M1 treatments,
the average implemented taxes were around 30%, while the theoretical equilibrium tax
rate is 47%.16 While in both treatments, there is a clear upward trend in the direction of
the equilibrium tax rate, it remains below 40% even in the last few matches. This effect of
below-equilibrium taxes is even stronger in the two treatments with income mobility and
persistent taxes (M2 and M3). There, we observe tax rates that are one half to two thirds
of the equilibrium tax rates, and the time series of implemented taxes across matches does
not show any upward trend, as was the case in NM and M1.
Note that our hypotheses for equilibrium tax rates were derived under the assumption
of agents’ risk neutrality. A natural question is: what happens if one allows for risk-averse
preferences? It is easy to see that allowing for risk-averse preferences would change our
hypotheses only in the treatments that feature persistent tax regimes. When the tax
regime is non-persistent, agents’ risk attitudes do not affect the equilibrium tax rates
since taxes are adjusted in every period following any changes in agents’ productivities.
Furthermore, for treatments with persistent taxes (M2 and M3), the equilibrium tax rates
with risk-averse agents are predicted to be higher than the equilibrium tax rates with
risk-neutral agents. This is a direct implication of the concavity of the utility function of
pivotal poor agents. Therefore, risk aversion cannot account for the deviations observed
in our experiments.
What can account for the fact that observed tax rates are significantly below equilib-
rium tax rates in all of our treatments? Why do the learning patterns look very different
between treatments with non-persistent and persistent taxes? This is the focus of the
current section.
4.2.1 Mechanical downward bias of implemented taxes
Our first observation is that the current setup features a purely mechanical bias in the
direction of lower-than-equilibrium taxes, and when one adjusts for this bias, the results
16This finding is surprising in light of past findings to the contrary documented in Agranov and Palfrey
(2015), who study taxation and redistribution in a one-period setup similar to the one studied here,
except that in their setup, societies consist of five different productivity levels, rather than the two levels
(poor and rich) in our setup.
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indeed replicate the past findings of Agranov and Palfrey (2015).17 The mechanical bias
works in the following way. Because the ideal tax rate of poor voters is 47% and the ideal
tax rate of rich voters is 0%, the pivotal voter is (theoretically) a poor voter. Although
this is what is usually observed in the data, there is significant between-subject variation
in the poor voters’ proposals. Indeed, in all four treatments, in the vast majority of
elections, the poor voter was the pivotal one.18 Thus, it is nearly always the case that the
lowest proposed tax rate among the poor voters is implemented since the two rich voters
usually propose very low taxes.
As a consequence of this heterogeneity, even if, on average, the taxes proposed by the
poor voters are equal to the equilibrium tax rate, the implemented tax rate under the
proposal mechanism will be biased downward.19
To check and see if it is this mechanical bias that causes the low taxes in NM and
M1, Figure 2 displays the time series of the median tax rate proposed by the three poor
voters in a group, averaged across groups. In both treatments without persistence of
taxes (NM and M1), the average median proposed tax rate by poor voters starts below
the equilibrium level but adjusts upward over time, reaching a level approximately equal
to the equilibrium tax rate by the end of the experiment.20
Regardless of the tax regime and mobility parameters, correction for this mechanical
bias has a big effect on observed taxes proposed by poor voters. While in all treatments,
this de-biasing brings the level of the time series of tax rates towards the equilibrium
tax rate, the evolution of proposed tax rates is different across treatments. In all treat-
ments, proposals of poor voters in the first match concentrate around 35%-40% tax rates.
However, as subjects gain experience with the game, the treatments separate out, with a
noticeable increase in treatments with non-persistent taxes (NM and M1) and a decrease
in treatments with persistent taxes (M2 and M3).
To evaluate the effect of the mechanical bias in a statistical sense, the first two columns
in Table 5 depict tax proposals of poor voters in each treatment in the experienced matches
and the corresponding theoretical predictions for such proposals. Statistical analysis re-
17Treatments NM and M1, which feature no tax persistence, can be viewed as robustness checks on
early studies that investigate equilibrium taxation and redistribution in a one-period static setting.
18Specifically, in the last five matches, in 80% of elections in the NM treatment, the group’s median
proposal comes from one of the poor voters. The corresponding fractions in the remaining treatments
are 69%, 82% and 87% for M1, M2 and M3, respectively.
19This was not an issue in the earlier Agranov and Palfrey (2015) study because the five voters’ ideal
tax rates were spread out, in contrast to the present design.
20This pattern of initially low tax rates followed by upward adjustment in the direction of equilibrium
is exactly the same pattern that Agranov and Palfrey (2015) reported, using a different distribution of
types and only one tax period.
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Figure 2: Tax Rate Proposed by Poor Voters (averages per match)TAXES	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Notes: In the NM and M1 treatments, we pool the data from the first and the second periods.
veals that one cannot reject the null hypothesis that tax proposals of poor voters in the
experienced matches are equal to the theoretically predicted ones in all four treatments:
p = 0.4262 in NM, p = 0.2308 in M1, p = 0.3036 in M2, and p = 0.4144 in M3. In
other words, we find that with the correction for the mechanical bias, the average tax
rate proposed by poor voters converges to their ideal tax rate, as predicted by the theory.
Table 5: Average Proposed Tax Rates in Experienced Matches
Proposals by Poor Proposals by Rich
theory mean (se) theory mean (se)
NM 0.47 0.44 (0.04) 0.00 0.11 (0.03)
M1 0.47 0.43 (0.04) 0.00 0.16 (0.03)
M2 0.38 0.33 (0.05) 0.00 0.07 (0.02)
M3 0.30 0.34 (0.04) 0.00 0.10 (0.03)
Notes: In the NM and M1 treatments, we pool the data from the first and the second periods.
4.2.2 Experienced mobility
Besides the mechanical effect described above, whereby heterogeneity alone can lead to a
downward bias in taxes, we consider another factor that may affect subjects’ preferences
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for redistribution in the presence of mobility and a persistent tax regime. This is a purely
behavioral factor, which we refer to as the experienced mobility hypothesis. According to
this hypothesis, some poor voters’ beliefs about the likelihood of upward mobility may
be affected by the relative frequency of mobility in the early matches of a session. This
purely behavioral explanation is because the subjects were told at the start of the ex-
periment the exact details of the match-independent stochastic mobility process used in
the experiment. Thus, there would be no mathematical reason for subjects to update
their beliefs about it in response to past observations. Nonetheless, one can imagine them
doing so. This experienced mobility hypothesis resembles the inference problem of agents
explored by Piketty (1995), according to which agents learn about the determinants of
economic success and likelihood of mobility through personal and dynastic experimenta-
tion. Heterogeneity in long-run beliefs about the prospects of mobility in these models is
a natural consequence of this learning process that involves costly effort.21
To test the experienced mobility hypothesis, in Table 6, we present the results of
separate random effects TOBIT regressions for the M2 and M3 treatments, in which we
regress tax rates proposed by poor voters on a measure of an individual voter’s experience
with mobility, controlling for her previous match proposal, the match number and her
risk attitudes. For both M2 and M3, we use the voter’s observed cumulative frequency
(between 0 and 1) of experiencing upward mobility in previous matches. In addition,
for M2, we include a separate variable that is the cumulative frequency with which their
group experienced mobility in previous matches.22
Several interesting patterns emerge from the estimations presented in Table 6. First,
poor voters respond to past mobility experience in their choices of the current tax pro-
posals. Specifically, in both M2 and M3, poor voters propose lower taxes in response
to experiencing upward mobility in previous matches. The effect is highly significant,
substantial and of the same magnitude for both M2 and M3 treatments. In particular,
if a subject were to experience mobility in half of the previous matches, this would, on
average, increase her tax proposal by about seven percentage points compared to never
having experienced upward mobility. Furthermore, in M2, the frequency with which a
voter’s group experiences mobility in past matches has a negative effect - significant and
21See also Ravallion and Lokshin (2000), as well as Corneo and Gruner (2002), who consider the per-
ception of mobility experienced at the community level and argue that individuals form their expectations
through the lens of observing what happens around them.
22In the M2 treatment, the fraction of times that the group would experience and observe mobility is 0.9·
α = 0.54 because there is 10% chance that reshuﬄing productivities yields the exact same productivities
for all five agents in a group. The second measure of experienced mobility is not included in the M3
regression because subjects were informed that reshuﬄing occurred in every match.
26
Table 6: Effect of Experienced Mobility on Tax Proposals of the Poor
M2 M3
Cumulative frequency of own mobility at t− 1 -13.99∗∗ (0.02) -14.08∗∗ (0.01)
Cumulative frequency of observing mobility in t− 1 -13.21∗∗ (0.02)
but own wage did not change
Tax rate proposed in t− 1 0.36∗∗ (0.00) 0.22∗∗ (0.00)
Match number 0.14 (0.71) -0.63∗ (0.09)
Risky investment -0.005 (0.97) 0.16 (0.15)
Constant 25.01∗∗ (0.01) 35.31∗∗ (0.00 )
# of observations 432 459
# of clusters 48 51
Log Likelihood -1721.28 -1929.62
Notes: Random effects TOBIT regressions. Dependent variable is Taxes proposed by Poor in match t,
for t > 1. Risky investment is a number between 0 and 100 (inclusive), with lower numbers indicating
a higher degree of risk aversion. Standard errors are clustered at the individual level. ∗∗ (∗) indicates
significance at 5% (10%) level, and p-values are reported in parentheses.
similar in magnitude - on a voter’s tax proposal. Second, we observe significant inertia in
a voter’s tax proposals in both the M2 and M3 treatment, as measured by the coefficient
on a voter’s t−1 tax proposal. Finally, there is no effect of match number or risk attitude
for either M2 or M3 treatments, suggesting that other learning effects or degree of risk
aversion are not significant factors affecting individual preferences for redistribution.
5 Conclusions
We characterize majority-rule equilibrium tax rates in an infinite-horizon model of tax
persistence, income mobility, and inequality and implement a two-period version of the
model in the laboratory in order to experimentally study the effects of tax persistence
and income mobility on the degree of redistribution and post-tax inequality. Our main
hypothesis is that if the median voter in the first period has prospects of upward mobility
in the second period and tax rates are persistent, then the tax rate will be decreasing
in the perceived likelihood of that upward mobility. The experiment varied both the
likelihood of income mobility (zero, moderate, high) and the tax regimes, which differ
in how often society can adjust tax rates - i.e., persistence of taxes. The results are
mostly supportive of the theoretical hypotheses. Indeed, income mobility results in a
lower implemented tax rate if tax rates are persistent, but not if tax rates are re-voted
every period. Tax persistence leads to lower tax rates and higher inequality. Mobility leads
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to lower inequality without tax persistence and does not affect tax rates. One surprising
finding is that increasing mobility from moderate to high actually decreases inequality, in
contradiction to the theoretical model. In terms of magnitudes of the observed endogenous
variables, we find that tax rates are significantly lower than theoretically predicted and
that levels of inequality are significantly higher. We also find that the effects of mobility
with tax persistence are considerably larger than theoretically predicted. That is, when
people face a possibility of upward mobility and are restricted to choosing the same tax
rates in both periods, they tend to enforce levels of redistribution that are lower than
the theoretically predicted ones, by a larger amount than is predicted. This effect cannot
be attributed to subjects’ risk aversion, since risk aversion would push the results in
the opposite direction. Our analysis of individual and group behavior suggests that this
pattern is partly explained a dynamic learning analysis of the data, the results of which
suggest that agents use past observations of experienced mobility to update beliefs about
future mobility, even though the stochastic process is time-independent.
Our theoretical and experimental results is a first step toward exploring dynamic mod-
els of redistribution in the presence of social mobility. From a theoretical perspective, our
approach introduces dynamic considerations into the classic setup of equilibrium taxa-
tion and redistribution, by modeling the dynamics as an infinite horizon stochastic game
and then characterizing its solution. In the basic model introduced here, a tractable and
unique equilibrium is obtained. From a substantive perspective, despite its simplicity, the
basic model delivers non-trivial results regarding interaction between tax regime persis-
tence, income mobility, and the underlying distribution of wage inequality in the labor
market. Comparative statics results about the effect of these factors on after-tax inequal-
ity and efficiency follow naturally. The experimental results confirm the main hypotheses
generated by theory. The philosophy behind theory-based experiments is to create simple
yet real economic environments, which capture main tradeoffs that economic agents face
in such environments, and to observe real subjects making decision with real economic
consequences. Our experimental results indicate that the model correctly identifies basic
tradeoff that people face in this dynamic environment. The results of the experiment
indicate that the theoretical framework developed here is plausible and cannot be dis-
missed out of hand. Of course, the basic model is very stark and one would like to see
the model extended to incorporate other important factors that can affect the dynamics
of equilibrium taxes and inequality. One of the stark features of the model is that there
is no aggregate uncertainty, so the equilibrium tax rate is the same in all states. There
are a number of ways to generalize this, such as incorporating productivity shocks to the
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economy or individual investment in human capital. The model could also be further
developed by enriching the model of the political process to include important institu-
tions such as elections and legislatures, and by allowing the tax receipts to be used for
public good expenditures as well as pure redistribution. In this way, we are hopeful that
framework can be useful as a basis for future theoretical research.
References
[1] Agranov, Marina and Thomas R. Palfrey. 2015.“Equilibrium Tax Rates and Income
Redistribution: A Laboratory Study,” Journal of Public Economics, 130: 45-58.
[2] Alesina Alesina, and Eliana La Ferrara. 2005. “Preferences for Redistribution in the
Land of Opportunities,” Journal of Public Economics, 89(5-6): 897-931.
[3] Benabou, Roland, and Efe Ok. 2001. “Social Mobility and the Demand for Redistri-
bution: The POUM Hypothesis,” Quarterly Journal of Economics, 116(2): 447-87.
[4] Charness, Gary, Imas, Alex and Uri Gneezy. 2013. “Experimental methods: Eliciting
risk preferences,” Journal of Economics Behavior and Organization, 87, 43-51.
[5] Checchi, D. and V. Dardanoni. 2002. “Mobility Comparisons: Does Using Different
Measures Matter?,” Research on Economic Inequality 9: 113-145.
[6] Checchi, D. and A. Filippin. 2004. “An Experimental Study of the POUM Hypoth-
esis,” Research on Economic Inequality 11: 115-36.
[7] Corneo, G. and H. Gru¨ner. 2002. “Individual Preferences for Political Redistribu-
tion,” Journal of Public Economics, 83: 83-107.
[8] Gneezy, Uri and Jan Potters. 1997. “An experiment on risk taking and evaluation
periods,” The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 112(2), 631-645.
[9] Konrad, K. and F. Morath. 2011. “Social Mobility and Redistributive Taxation,”
Working paper #2011-2, Max Planck Institute for Tax Law and Public Finance,
Munich.
[10] Meltzer, A. H., and Richard, S. F. 1981. “A rational theory of the size of government,”
Journal of Political Economy 89: 914-927.
[11] Piketty, T. 1995. “Social Mobility and Redistributive Politics,” Quarterly Journal of
Economics 110, 551-84.
[12] Ravallion, M. and M. Loshkin. 2000. “Who Wants to Redistribute? The Tunnel
Effect in 1990s Russia,” Journal of Public Economics 76(1), 87-104.
29
[13] Roberts, K. W. S. 1977. “Voting over income tax schedules,” Journal of Public Eco-
nomics 8, 329-340.
[14] Romer, T. 1975. “Individual welfare, majority voting and the properties of a linear
income tax,” Journal of Public Economics 4, 163-185.
[15] Rainer, H. and T. Siedler. 2008. “Subjective Income and Employment Expectations
and Preferences for Redistribution,” Economics Letters, 99(3): 449-453.
30
APPENDIX
Proofs
Proof of Lemma 1. The maximization problem of an agent i in period k with produc-
tivity wki when tax rate is t
k is
max
xki
[
(1− tk) · wki xki −
1
2
(
xki
)2
+
1
n
·
n∑
j=1
tk · wkj xkj
]
This is a well-defined concave problem with unique solution xk
∗
i which depends only on
the tax rate tk and agent own productivity wki
xk
∗
i =
(
1− tk + t
k
n
)
wki
Proof of Proposition 1. To characterize preferences for taxes in period 0 for an agent
with productivity wi, we need to take into account not only the current productivity of the
agent, but his prospects for future productivity. We can think of his current productivity
as his current “state”, and then look at the transition probabilities to other states. We
also have to take account of the possibility that tomorrow the tax rate might change. If
it changes, it will change to t∗(p), which is the equilibrium tax rate that is derived from
solving the dynamic program. Each state will have a continuation value associated with
it, denote by V , and this generates a system of n equations of the following form:
Vi(wi, t) = u
∗
i (wi, t) + δp
[
(1− α)Vi(wi, t) + α
n
n∑
j=1
Vj(wj, t)
]
+ δ(1− p)
[
(1− α)Vi(wi, t∗(p)) + α
n
n∑
j=1
Vj(wj, t
∗(p))
] (8)
where optimal labor supply is given by x∗i (wi, t) =
(
1− t+ t
n
) · wi as shown in Lemma 1
and optimal per-period utility is
u∗i (wi, t) =
w2i
2
·
(
(1− t)2 − t
2
n2
)
+ Z · t
n
(
1− t+ t
n
)
(9)
where
Z =
n∑
j=1
w2j
represents aggregate income of the economy if the tax rate is zero and all workers choose
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labor optimally.
Note that the third term in (8) is a constant with respect to t, so we write it as
K(wi, t
∗(p)). Thus, for each i = 1, 2, ..., n we have the following equation:
(1− δp(1− α)) · Vi(wi, t) = u∗i (wi, t) +
αδp
n
n∑
j=1
Vj(wj, t) + δ(1− p)K(wi, t∗(p)) (10)
where
K(wi, t
∗(p)) = (1− α)Vi(wi, t∗(p)) + α
n
n∑
j=1
Vj(wj, t
∗(p))
Summing these equations across all productivity types and dividing both sides by n:
(1− δp(1− α)) · V¯ (t) = u¯∗(t) + αδp · V¯ (t) + δ(1− p)K¯(t∗(p))
where
V¯ (t) =
1
n
n∑
j=1
Vj(wj, t)
u¯∗(t) =
1
n
n∑
j=1
u∗j(wj, t)
K¯(t∗(p)) =
1
n
n∑
j=1
K(wj, t
∗(p)) = (1− α)V¯ (t∗(p)) + αV¯ (t∗(p)) = V¯ (t∗(p))
Thus,
V¯ (t) =
u¯∗(t)
1− δp +
δ(1− p)
1− δp K¯(t
∗(p))
Plugging these expressions into (10) gives us for each i = 1, 2, ..., n:
Vi(wi, t) =
u∗i (wi, t)
1− δp(1− α) +
αδp · u¯∗(t)
(1− δp)(1− δp(1− α))+
+
αδ2p(1− p)K¯(t∗(p))
(1− δp)(1− δp(1− α)) +
δ(1− p) ·K(wi, t∗(p))
1− δp(1− α) =
=
u∗i (wi, t)
1− δp(1− α) +
αδp · u¯∗(t)
(1− δp)(1− δp(1− α))+
+
δ(1− p)
1− δp(1− α) ·
[
α
1− δpV¯ (t
∗(p)) + (1− α)Vi(wi, t∗(p))
]
(11)
This last expression is just a weighted average between i’s current period utility with
productivity wi and the average utility of all types when the tax rate is t plus a constant
term that does not depend on t. The first-order conditions can be written as
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∂Vi(wi, t)
∂t
=
1
1− δp(1− α) ·
[
∂u∗i (wi, t)
∂t
+
αδp
1− δp ·
∂u¯∗(t)
∂t
]
≤ 0 (12)
∂u∗i (wi, t)
∂t
=
(
Z
n
− w2i
)
− t · n
2 − 1
n2
·
(
2Z
n+ 1
− w2i
)
u¯∗(t) =
Z
2n
(
(1− t)2 − t
2
n2
)
+ Z
t
n
(
1− t+ t
n
)
⇒ ∂u¯
∗(t)
∂t
= −Z (n− 1)
2
n3
· t
Then, the first-order condition can be written as
∂Vi(wi, t)
∂t
=
1
1− δp(1− α) ·
[
Z
n
− w2i − t ·
n2 − 1
n2
·
(
2Z
n+ 1
− w2i +
αδp
1− δp ·
Z(n− 1)
(n+ 1)n
)]
≤ 0
The second-order condition is
∂2V (wi, t)
∂t2
= − 1
1− δp(1− α) ·
n2 − 1
n2
·
(
2Z
n+ 1
− w2i +
αδp
1− δp ·
Z(n− 1)
(n+ 1)n
)
When w2i <
Z
n
we have interior solution because there exists t∗ ∈ (0, 1) such that
∂Vi(wi, t)
∂t
|t=t∗ = 0 and ∂
2Vi(wi, t)
∂t2
< 0
This interior solution is
t∗i =
n2
n2 − 1 ·
Z
n
− w2i
Z
n+1
(
2 + αδp
1−δp · n−1n
)
− w2i
When w2i ∈
[
Z
n
, Z
n+1
(
2 + αδp
1−δp · n−1n
))
, we have ∂
2Vi(wi,t)
∂t2
< 0, thus, max ∂Vi(wi,t)
∂t
= ∂Vi(wi,t)
∂t
|t=0 =
1
1−δp(1−α) ·
(
Z
n
− w2i
)
< 0, thus ∂Vi(wi,t)
∂t
< 0 for all t ∈ [0, 1], which means t∗ = 0 in this
region. Finally, when w2i >
Z
n+1
(
2 + αδp
1−δp · n−1n
)
, we have ∂
2Vi(wi,t)
∂t2
> 0 which means that
max ∂Vi(wi,t)
∂t
= ∂Vi(wi,t)
∂t
|t=1 < 0, and, therefore, t∗ = 0 in this region as well. Combining
all the conditions, we obtain
t∗i =

n2
n2 − 1 ·
Z
n
− w2i
Z
n+1
(
2 + αδp
1−δp · n−1n
)
− (wi)2
if (wi)
2 <
Z
n
0 otherwise
Proof of Corollary 1. Here we consider the effect of an increase in tax persistence p on
equilibrium tax rate when (wm)
2 < Z
n
.
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∂t∗(p)
∂p
= − n
2
n2 − 1 ·
(
Z
n
− (wm)2
)(
Z
n+1
[
2 + αδp
1−δp · n−1n
]
− w2m
)2 · Zn+ 1 · αδ(n− 1)(1− δp)2n < 0
Proof of Corollary 2. Next we consider the effect of an increase in α on equilibrium
tax rate when(wm)
2 < Z
n
.
∂t∗(p)
∂α
= − n
2
n2 − 1 ·
(
Z
n
− (wm)2
)(
Z
n+1
[
2 + αδp
1−δp · n−1n
]
− w2m
)2 · Zn+ 1 · δp(n− 1)(1− δ)n < 0
Proof of Proposition 2. Here we evaluate ∂ var(Vi(wi,t
∗))
∂p
where
var(Vi(wi, t
∗)) =
1
n
n∑
j=1
(
Vj(wj, t
∗)− V¯ (t∗))2
and Vi(wi, t
∗) is the long-run income of agent i with productivity wi. This exercise is
meaningful for (wm)
2 < Z
n
, which guarantees that median agent demands positive tax
rates. As we have established in the proof of Proposition 1, Vi(wi, t
∗) can be written as
Vi(wi, t
∗) =
u∗i (wi, t
∗)
1− δp(1− α)+
αδp · u∗(t∗)
(1− δp)(1− δp(1− α))+
δ(1− p)
1− δp(1− α) ·
[
αV¯ (t∗)
1− δp + (1− α)Vi(wi, t
∗)
]
where
V¯ (t∗) =
u¯∗(t∗)
1− δp +
δ(1− p)
1− δp · K¯(t
∗) =
u¯∗(t∗)
1− δp +
δ(1− p)
1− δp · V¯ (t
∗)
Therefore,
V¯ (t∗) =
u¯∗(t∗)
1− δ
Plugging V¯ (t∗) into Vi(wi, t∗) and simplifying gives us
Vi(wi, t
∗) =
u∗i (wi, t
∗)
1− δ(1− α) +
αδ · u¯∗(t∗)
(1− δ)(1− δ(1− α))
⇒ var(Vi(wi, t∗)) = 1
n
n∑
j=1
(
u∗i (wi, t
∗)
1− δ(1− α) +
αδ · u¯∗(t∗)
(1− δ)(1− δ(1− α)) −
u¯∗(t∗)
1− δ
)2
=
=
1
n(1− δ(1− α))2
n∑
j=1
(
u∗j(wj, t
∗)− u¯∗(t∗))2
u∗i (wi, t
∗) =
w2i
2
(
(1− t∗)2 − (t
∗)2
n2
)
+ Z · t
∗
n
(
1− t+ t
∗
n
)
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u¯∗(t∗) =
Z
2n
(
(1− t∗)2 − (t
∗)2
n2
)
+ Z · t
∗
n
(
1− t∗ + t
∗
n
)
⇒ u∗i (wi, t∗)− u¯∗(t∗) =
(
(1− t∗)2 − (t
∗)2
n2
)
w2i − Zn
2
var(Vi(wi, t
∗)) =
(
(1− t∗)2 − (t∗)2
n2
)2
n(1− δ + δα)2
n∑
j=1
(w2j − Zn )2
4
=
(
(1− t∗)2 − (t∗)2
n2
)2
n(1− δ + δα)2 · ψ
where ψ is a positive constant term that does not depend on parameters (α, δ, p). As can
be seen from the expression of the variance, the effect of tax persistence on inequality is
solely due to change in the equilibrium tax rate t∗ which is affected by change in p. Thus,
∂var(Vi(wi, t
∗))
∂p
=
2
(
(1− t∗)2 − (t∗)2
n2
)
n(1− δ + δα)2 ·
[
− 2(1− t∗)− 2t
∗
n2
]
· ∂t
∗
∂p
> 0
since ∂t
∗
∂p
< 0 as shown in Corollary 1. This completes the proof that inequality increases
with tax persistence.
Proposition 3. Here we evaluate ∂ var(Vi(wi,t
∗))
∂α
for the interior value of equilibrium tax
rate and for each of the two cases described in the proof of Proposition 2. To simplify the
exposition, we will write t instead of t∗ in this section.
var (Vi(wi, t)) =
(
(1− t∗)2 − (t∗)2
n2
)2
n(1− δ + δα)2 · ψ
∂ var(Vi(wi, t))
∂α
=
2ψ
(
(1− t)2 − t2
n2
)
n(1− δ + δα)3 ·
[(
−2(1− t)− 2t
n2
)
(1− δ + αδ) ∂t
∂α
− δ
(
(1− t)2 − t
2
n2
)]
Denote by A = Z
n
− w2m, B = 2Zn+1 − w2m and C = Z δ(n−1)n(n+1)(1−δp) and re-write equilibrium
tax and other expressions using this notation:
t =
n2
n2 − 1 ·
A
B + αp · C
∂t
∂α
= − n
2p · AC
(n2 − 1)(B + αp · C)2
−2(1− t)− 2t
n2
=
2A
B + αp · C − 2
(1− t)2 − t
2
n2
= 1 +
n2A (A− 2(B + αp · C))
(n2 − 1)(B + αp · C)2
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Then,(
−2(1− t)− 2t
n2
)
(1− δ + αδ) ∂t
∂α
− δ
(
(1− t)2 − t
2
n2
)
=
=
2n2p · AC(1− δ + αδ)(−A+B + αp · C)
(n2 − 1)(B + αp · C)3 − δ
[
1 +
n2A(A− 2(B + αp · C))
(n2 − 1)(B + αp · C)2
]
=
=
1
(n2 − 1)(B + αp · C)2 ·
2n
2p · AC(1− δ + αδ)(−A+B + αp · C)
B + αp · C −
− δ ·
(
(n2 − 1)(B + αp · C)2 + n2A(A− 2(B + αp · C))
)
 =
=
1
(n2 − 1)(B + αp · C)2 · [K−M]
where
K =
2n2p · AC(1− δ + αδ)(−A+B + αp · C)
B + αp · C
M = δ ·
(
(n2 − 1)(B + αp · C)2 + n2A(A− 2(B + αp · C))
)
The next step is to substitute back expressions for A, B and C into K and M, and
characterize shapes of functions K(p) and M(p) for p ∈ [0, 1]. Provided that α ∈ (0, 1),
δ ∈ (0, 1), (wm)2 < Zn and n ≥ 3, we establish that:
• K is strictly increasing and convex function of p for p ∈ [0, 1]
• M is strictly increasing and convex function of p for p ∈ [0, 1]
• Kp=0 <Mp=0
• Kp=1 >Mp=1 when α ∈ (0, 1), Z > Z¯(n,w) and δ < δ¯(α,Z, n, wm)
• Kp=1 <Mp=1 otherwise
Therefore, as long as Z > Z¯(n,wm) and δ < δ¯(α,Z, n), there exists a unique p¯ such that
∂ var(Vi(wi, t))
∂α
< 0 for p ∈ (0, p¯)
∂ var(Vi(wi, t))
∂α
> 0 for p ∈ (p¯, 1)
Otherwise, for all p ∈ (0, 1) we obtain ∂ var(Vi(wi,t))
∂α
< 0. This completes the proof of
Proposition 3.
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Instructions
Sample Instructions for M2 treatment
Welcome. You are about to participate in an experiment on decision-making and you
will be paid for your participation in cash privately at the end of the session. Do not talk
to or attempt to communicate with other participants during the session. Please take
a minute and turn off all electronic devices, especially phones. During the experiment
you are not allowed to open or use any other applications on these laboratory computers,
except for the interface of the experiment.
The experiment consists of three parts. Each part is self-contained. Before the begin-
ning of each part, we will read out loud detailed instructions about that part.
The currency in this experiment is called points. All payoffs are denominated in this
currency. Points that you earn during the experiment will be converted into US dollars.
We will sum up your earnings in all three parts of the experiment, add a $7 participation
fee for the completion of the experiment and pay it to you in private in cash at the end
of the experiment. The money you earn will depend on your decisions and the decisions
of others.
Part I. In this part of the experiment you are endowed with 100 points. Your task is
to choose how many points you wish to invest in a risky project. You can choose any
number of points between 0 and 100 points, inclusive. Those points not invested are yours
to keep.
The Risky Project: there is a 50% chance that the risky project will be successful. If
it is successful, you receive 2.2 times the amount you chose to invest. If the project is
unsuccessful, you lose the amount invested. To determine if the project is successful or
not the computer will flip a computerized fair coin. If the coin will land on heads then
the project is successful and if it will land on tails then project is unsuccessful.
Example: Say you invested X out of 100 points in the risky project, where X represents
your choice. (Recall, it can be any number between 0 and 100, inclusive.) Then, with
probability 50% you will receive (100−X) + 2.2 ∗X points and with probability 50% you
will receive (100−X) + 2.2 ∗ 0 = 100−X points.
In this part of the experiment 50 points = $1. Your earnings in this task will be added
to your earnings in the next part of the experiment.
Please write down the station number you are sitting in:
Please write down how many points you want to invest in the risky project:
(this can be any number between 0 and 100)
Part II. There will be 10 rounds in this part of the experiment. Before the first round
begins, all participants will be randomly divided into groups of 5 participants each. In
addition, each participant will be assigned a value V . There are two possible values of V :
V = 5 and V = 10. We have 25 participants in this experiment: fifteen participants will
be assigned value of V = 5 and ten participants will be assigned value of V = 10. In all
groups, there will be three members with V=5 and two members with V = 10.
Your group assignment and your assigned value V will stay the same for all 10 rounds
of Part II. The computer does these assignments randomly. Your assigned value will be
37
displayed on your computer screen.
Your task in each round is to choose an investment level. Your investment can be any
number between 0 and 15 (up to two decimal places). If you choose investment X and
your value is V , this will generate your total investment earnings equal to V · X. For
example, if V = 10 and X = 4, then your total investment earnings in that round are
computed by 10 ∗ 4 = 40 points.
However, investment is not free. The cost to you of investing X is equal to 0.5 ·X2.
In the example just given, the investment of X = 4 costs you 8 points. These costs are
subtracted from your earnings at the end of the round.
A portion of your investment earnings for the round will be taxed. If the tax rate is
T%, then your taxes will equal T% of your investment earnings, and you will keep the
remaining (100 − T )% of your investment earnings. The amount you keep after taxes is
called your after tax investment earnings. Recall the example just given, where V = 10
and X = 4, and your total investment earnings is 40 points. If the tax rate is 50% then
your taxes equal 20 points and your after tax investment earnings, which are yours to
keep, equal 20 points.
The taxes everyone in your group pays are not thrown away. Rather, the total taxes
collected from all members of your group are rebated to the group members in equal
shares at the end of each round. For example, if the total amount collected as taxes from
all members of the group equals 100 points, then each member will receive back one fifth
of this amount, or 20 points. Note that all members of the group are taxed at the same
tax rate in a round, and all group members share equally the total taxes collected in the
group.
To summarize, your total earnings in a round depend on the value V assigned to you
at the beginning of round 1, your investment X, tax rate T and the tax rebate, which
is determined by the total taxes collected from all members in your group. Your total
earnings in a round consist of three parts:
Total Earnings = Your After Tax Investment Earnings - Your Cost of Investment + Tax Rebate
• After-Tax Earnings = (1− T )% of V ·X
• Cost of Investment = 0.5 ·X2
• Tax Rebate = 1
5
·Taxes collected in your group
• Taxes collected in your group = T ·Investment Earnings of 1 + T ·Investment Earn-
ings of 2 + T ·Investment Earnings of 3 + T ·Investment Earnings of 4 + T ·Investment
Earnings of 5
Thus, your total earnings for the round in this example would be equal to 20−8+20 =
32 points.
At the beginning of each round a tax rate T will be displayed on your screen. This
tax rate is the same for all members in your group. However, your group’s tax rate may
change from round to round. After observing your group’s tax rate, you and all other
members of your group will be asked to independently choose your investment levels,
which can be any non-negative number between 0 and 15 up to two decimal places.
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The screen has a calculator to assist you in deciding how much to invest in each round.
The calculator calculates hypothetical earnings for each of the two possible values that
your group members have (V = 5 and V = 10). In particular, this calculator calculates
your hypothetical earnings in different scenarios.
Here is how the calculator works. In the first row of the calculator, you need to choose
value for which you would like to calculate hypothetical earnings. There is a drop-down
menu with two options V = 5 and V = 10. The second row of the calculator displays
your group’s tax rate. In the third row of the calculator, you need to enter a hypothetical
investment level and a hypothetical amount of total taxes from the other four members
of your group in the fourth row. The last row (the fifth one) then displays total earnings
of a member with chosen value if those hypothetical amounts were the actual amounts
in that round. You can use the up and down buttons to try calculate payoffs in different
hypothetical scenarios. (If you enter these manually instead of using the buttons, you will
need to press “Enter” for the calculator to work.) The numbers you enter in the calculator
are just hypothetical and do not affect yours or someone else’s actual earnings. Remember
that your and everyone’s else tax rebate consist of one fifth of the taxes collected from
one own investment earnings and one fifth of the taxes collected from the other group
members.
After everyone has entered their investment decision and clicked on the “Submit”
button the computer will display your investment decision as well as the investment
decisions made by the all other members of your group. It will appear in a table that also
shows their values. All of your own information is highlighted in Red on the table. It will
also show your earnings for the round, in points, broken down into its three components:
after tax investment income, cost of investment, and tax rebate. All of this information
is also summarized at the bottom of your screen in the history panel. The history panel
will keep track of everything that has happened in your group in all rounds, highlighting
your own information in red.
When round 1 is finished, we will move on directly to the next round. The next round
will be identical to the previous round except your group’s new tax rate T will be posted
on your screen.
At the end of Part II, we will sum up all the points that you earned in all 10 rounds
of Part II and will convert them into US dollars using the rate 40 points = $1. Summary:
• There are 10 rounds in this part of the experiment.
• At the beginning of the first round, each participant is assigned one of the two
possible values: fifteen participants get value V = 5 and ten participants get value
V = 10.
• Also, at the beginning of the first round, participants are randomly matched into
groups of five members each with three members with value V = 5 and two members
with V = 10.
• Group assignment and value assignment stays the same for the whole duration of
this part of the experiment.
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• At the beginning of each round, all members of the group observe the tax rate for
this round.
• After that, all group members are asked to choose an investment level (number
between 0 and 15 with up to two decimal places).
• After that, decisions and earnings for that round are displayed on your screen and
recorded in the history panel.
Part III. Part III of the experiment consists of 10 matches, and each match consists of
2 rounds. The group assignments do not change. They are exactly the same as in Part II
and you will remain in the same group in all rounds of all matches in Part III.
In the first round of all 10 matches, you will have the same value that you had in Part
II of the experiment. Your value in the second round of a match may be the same or may
be different from the one you had in the first round. It is determined as follows: with
probability 40% your value in the second round of a match will be the same as your value
in the first. However, with probability 60% the computer will randomly assign values
between the members of your group, so that there are still three members with value
V = 5 and two members with value V = 10. In other words, if you have value V = 5 in
the first round, then with probability 40% + 60% · 3
5
= 76% you will keep V = 5 in the
second round and with probability 60% · 2
5
= 24% you will get the new value of V = 10
for the second period. If, on the other hand, you have value V = 10 in the first round,
then with probability 40% + 60% · 2
5
= 64% you will keep V = 10 in the second round and
with probability 60% · 3
5
= 36% you will get the new value of V = 5 for the second round.
Your value in each round of each match will be clearly displayed on the computer screen.
Each round in Part III is similar to Part II, except that in each match at the beginning
of the first round all members of the group are asked to submit a proposal for the tax
rate T.
While you are deciding what tax rate you wish to propose, the screen has a calculator
to assist you in deciding. You can calculate hypothetical earnings for a round as follows.
First choose from the drop-down menu for which value you are calculating hypothetical
earnings. In the second row, enter a hypothetical group tax rate. In the third row,
enter a hypothetical investment decision of the member with the value chosen by you in
the first row. Finally, in the fourth row, enter a hypothetical total taxes amount from
the other four members of your group. You can use the up and down buttons to try
different hypothetical levels. The fifth (and the last) row then displays what would be
total earnings for the chosen member in a round if those hypothetical amounts were the
actual amounts. (If you enter these manually instead of using the buttons, you will need
to press “Enter” for the calculator to work.) The numbers you enter in the calculator are
just hypothetical and do not affect your actual earnings.
After each member of your group has submitted a proposed tax rate, the third highest
of the five proposed tax rates is implemented as your group’s tax rate in both rounds of
this match. The chosen tax rate will be clearly posted on your screen and is the same
for everyone in your group. You will then be asked to choose an investment decision (as
you did in the Part II of the experiment). Your investment decision can be any number
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between 0 and 15 up to two decimal places. You may use the calculator to explore different
hypothetical scenarios, as you did in Part II.
Once everyone in your group have submitted their investments, your payoff for the
first round of a match will be determined and we move on to the second round of the
current match.
At the beginning of the second round, you will observe your value for the second round,
which may be the same as your value in the first round or different. It is determined based
on the mechanism described above. Then you will be reminded of the tax rate chosen by
your group in the first round. After that you will be prompted to choose your investment
level. After all members of your group choose their investment level, you will observe
your earnings in the second round.
After the first match is over, we will move on to the second match, in which you will
first observe your value for the first round and then will be asked to submit a proposal
for the tax rate for your group. The third highest proposal will be implemented as your
group tax rate in both rounds of a match.
To remind you, as before, your earnings in each round depend on your value, your
chosen investment X, tax rate T and the tax return, which is determined by the total
taxes collected from all members in your group.
Total Earnings = Your After Tax Investment Earnings - Your Cost of Investment + Tax Rebate
• After-Tax Earnings = (1− T )% of V ·X
• Cost of Investment = 0.5 ·X2
• Tax Rebate = 1
5
·Taxes collected in your group
• Taxes collected in your group = T ·Investment Earnings of 1 + T ·Investment Earn-
ings of 2 + T ·Investment Earnings of 3 + T ·Investment Earnings of 4 + T ·Investment
Earnings of 5
At the end of Part III, we will sum up all the points that you earned in all 10 matches of
Part III and will convert them into US dollars using the rate 40 points = $1.
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Additional Analysis
Labor Supply Decisions
The next two tables, replicate analysis discussed in the main text of the paper using differ-
ent regression specifications. In particular, Table 7 presents estimates of the normalized
labor supply functions for each period of the game separately using the data from all 10
matches of the game. Table 8 pools both periods of the game together, focuses on the
experienced matches and clusters standard errors at the individual (rather than at the
group) level.
Table 7: Estimated Normalized Labor Supply in Each Period (all 10 matches)
NM treatment M1 treatment
const (se) slope (se) const (se) slope (se)
Poor (period 1) 0.98 (0.02) -0.73 (0.06) 1.02 (0.02) -0.79 (0.06)
Poor (period 2) 0.99 (0.01) -0.78 (0.04) 0.99 (0.02) -0.71 (0.05)
Rich (period 1) 0.99 (0.04) -0.77 (0.07) 1.01 (0.03) -0.84 (006)
Rich (period 2) 0.96 (0.04) -0.71 (0.06) 1.01 (0.02) -0.82 (0.06)
M2 treatment M3 treatment
const (se) slope (se) const (se) slope (se)
Poor (period 1) 1.00 (0.03) -0.65 (0.08) 0.97 (0.02) -0.68 (0.07)
Poor (period 2) 0.99 (0.03) -0.60∗∗ (0.09) 0.99 (0.02) -0.72 (0.06)
Rich (period 1) 1.03 (0.03) -0.90 (0.06) 0.99 (0.01) -0.75 (0.03)
Rich (period 2) 0.94∗∗ (0.03) -0.72 (0.09) 0.92∗∗ (0.02) -0.67 (0.07)
Notes: Random effects TOBIT regressions of normalized labor supply decisions regressed on implemented
tax rates and a constant, using data from each of the periods separately. Robust standard errors are
clustered at the group level and reported in the parenthesis. Normalized labor supply is labor supply
divided by productivity. ∗∗ indicates that theoretically predicted value of a coefficient falls outside of
95% confidence interval of estimated coefficients.
Proposed Taxes
Figure 3 depicts cumulative distribution functions of tax rates proposed by poor and
rich agents in the experienced matches in each treatment separately. Few patterns are
apparent from these figures and statistical analysis. First, poor subjects propose higher
tax rates than rich subjects in every single treatment. Regression analysis, in which we
regress proposed taxes on a dummy variable that indicates rich subject while clustering
standard errors by individuals confirms this result at the standard 5% significance level.
Second, poor subjects propose lower tax rates when taxes are persistent as in M2 and
M3 treatments compared with treatments in which taxes can be adjusted in every period
of the game as in NM and M1 treatments. This can be seen from left panel of Figure 3
as distributions of taxes in NM and M1 treatments first-order stochastically dominates
distributions of taxes in M2 and M3 treatments. Regression analysis corroborates this
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Table 8: Estimated Normalized Labor Supply in Experienced Matches
NM treatment M1 treatment
const (se) slope (se) const (se) slope (se)
Poor 0.96 (0.02) -0.73 (0.05) 0.98 (0.02) -0.66∗∗ (0.04)
Rich 0.96 (0.03) -0.69 (0.06) 0.98 (0.02) -0.77 (0.05)
M2 treatment M3 treatment
const (se) slope (se) const (se) slope (se)
Poor 1.02 (0.02) -0.76 (0.08) 0.98 (0.02) -0.73 (0.05)
Rich 0.96 (0.02) -0.72 (0.08) 0.96 (0.02) -0.76 (0.04)
Notes: Random effects TOBIT regressions of normalized labor supply decisions regressed on implemented
tax rates and a constant, using data from each of the periods separately. Robust standard errors are
clustered at the subject level and reported in the parenthesis. Normalized labor supply is labor supply
divided by productivity. ∗∗ indicates that theoretically predicted value of a coefficient falls outside of
95% confidence interval of estimated coefficients.
conclusion with significant difference detected between average proposed taxes in NM and
M2 treatments (p = 0.058) and NM versus M3 treatments (p = 0.045). The comparison
of average taxes between M1 and M2 or M3 treatments are not statistically significant
despite first-order stochastically dominance relation.
Figure 3: CDFs of Taxes Proposed by Poor and Rich in Experienced Matches
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Notes: For NM and M1 treatments, we pool together data from period 1 and period 2 of the game.
Inequality
Here we consider treatment effects on inequality levels using a GINI coefficient instead of
variance of long-run payoffs. Figure 3 depicts cumulative distribution functions of esti-
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mated GINI coefficients across treatments using the data from the experienced matches.
To compare GINI coefficients between two treatments we use regression analysis, in which
we regress estimated GINI on a constant and a dummy variable that indicates one of the
considered treatments, while clustering observations by groups. We conclude that there
is a significant difference between two treatments if estimated coefficient on the indicator
function is statistically different from zero at the standard 5% significance level and report
p-value associated with it.
Figure 4: CDFs of GINI Coefficients in Experienced Matches
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Notes: For NM and M1 treatments, we pool together data from period 1 and period 2 of the game.
Similar to Hypothesis 4 described in the main text of the paper, for parameters used
in our experiments, for a given level of mobility, higher tax persistence leads to higher
inequality as measured by GINI coefficients. This prediction is born out in our data as
the distribution of GINI coefficients observed in M1 treatment first-order stochastically
dominates the one observed in M2 treatment, which differ only in the stickiness of the
tax regime. Regression analysis confirms prediction this with p = 0.025.
The same is true for Hypothesis 5, which highlights the differential effect of an increase
in mobility on inequality depending on the persistence of tax regime. For parameters in
our treatments, when taxes are revoted on in every period, higher mobility promotes
equality, while the opposite is true when tax rates are persist from period 1 to period
2. Consistent with this prediction, we observe that inequality decreases when mobility is
introduced in the absence of tax persistence (NM versus M1 treatments) albeit the effect is
not statistically significant (p > 0.10). However, contrary to theoretical prediction, when
taxes are persistent, distribution of GINI coefficients observed in M3 treatment first-order
stochastically dominates the one in M3 treatment, which indicates that higher mobility
promotes equality even when tax regime is sticky. However, this shift is not significant
according to regression analysis.
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